Peer Reviewed Publications
‘Central Bankers in Crisis: Interpersonal Trust, Cooperation, and the Creation of the Fed Swap Network During the 2008 Global Financial Crisis.’ (2024). International Studies Quarterly, volume 68, issue 2. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1093/isq/sqae030
2022 Best Graduate Paper Award, International Political Economy Section of the International Studies Association. (Under previous title: This Time It’s Interpersonal: Central Bankers’ Cooperation and the Creation of the Fed Swap Network During the Global Financial Crisis)
Abstract:
How do policymakers respond to global crises? I argue that interpersonal trust enables policymakers to engage in ad hoc cooperation, in conditions of crisis and uncertainty. Specifically, leaders' differential ties—of stronger, looser, or absent—interpersonal trust influenced economies' access to Federal Reserve swap lines over costlier unilateral and multilateral alternatives during the 2008 Global Financial Crisis. Using this framework, I reexamine the emergence of the Fed swap network. I triangulate evidence from elite interviews with former central bankers in office during the crisis, and transcripts of Fed meetings. My findings highlight the role of interpersonal trust as an operating variable in shaping patterns of international cooperation, and problematize the politics of technocratic governance. While successful, in enacting these crisis management policies, central bankers reinforce hierarchies and secrecy in global governance. This article thus draws attention to the contentious and undemocratic underpinnings of the global financial safety net.
‘Drawing the Line: The Politics of Federal Currency Swaps in the Global Financial Crisis.’ (2019). Review of International Political Economy, volume 26, issue 3. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1080/09692290.2019.1572639
Abstract:
Injecting over two trillion dollars into the international economy, the Federal Reserve effectively operated as an international lender of last resort during the 2008 financial crisis. Over half a trillion dollars went to foreign central banks through bilateral arrangements known as Central Bank Liquidity Swaps. While studies show that a key determinant of a country’s chances of receiving Fed liquidity was the exposure of US banks to the foreign economy, the literature overlooks the ambiguous and politicized nature of the Fed’s decision-making that explains the selection of emerging market swap recipients. Through a consideration of all economies that officially requested a swap line, including those rejected, this article analyses the bilateral politics of Fed swaps. By evaluating transcripts of the Fed’s deliberations, it identifies strategic motivations underlying the Fed’s decision-making and argues the Fed was more likely to grant a swap to economies that shared its policy preferences for greater capital account openness. Further, the article argues that the influence of shared policy preferences was mediated by political and diplomatic considerations. The article concludes that the Fed strategically chose its emerging economy partners to reinforce economic alliances, particularly with those who experienced increased influence in economic governance post-2008.
Working Papers and Chapters
‘Central Bankers’ in The Routledge Handbook of the History of Central Banking. (Eds) Clemens Jobst and Stefano Ugolini. Routledge (Under Contract).
‘Thinking Locally, Acting Globally: The Domestic Legitimacy of the US Federal Reserve as a Global Governor.’ With Michael Allen, Stanford University. Revise and Resubmit.
Abstract:
The US Federal Reserve regularly acts as the international lender of last resort. What effect does the Fed's global activism have on the US public's trust in it as an independent agency? Using two pre-registered survey experiments, we evaluate the effect of informational cues about the Fed's international lending on respondents' level of policy support and trust in the Fed. We find that performance- and procedural-cues affect attitudes towards policy support and trust differently. Policy support is influenced by performance cues concerning its effectiveness and geopolitical implications. Institutional trust is unaffected by performance cues but is influenced by cues expressing concern for the Fed's democratic accountability. Our findings contribute to debates on the popular support for central bank independence and the legitimacy of domestic institutions engaging in global governance.
‘The Limits of Economic Statecraft: China's Bilateral Swap Agreements and the External Security Environment.’ With Siyao Li, University of Pittsburgh, and Scott Wingo, The Bureau of Economic Analysis.
Abstract:
The People's Bank of China (PBoC) has signed forty-one bilateral swap arrangements (BSAs) with a diverse set of partner economies since 2009. Despite China's increasing economic clout, monetary cooperation in China's regional orbit has been limited. Why is the reach of China's monetary ambitions limited in its own neighbourhood? We argue that the scope of China's swap network is constrained by security and geopolitical considerations by China and its partners. Our argument hinges on two dimensions of interest: whether a state is a US ally and its geographic proximity to China. We build our argument using qualitative evidence from elite interviews with current and former financial leaders from China's swap counterparties, and test our argument quantitatively using a cross-national panel of China's BSAs. We find that the likelihood of signing BSAs is influenced by states' security relations with both the US and China. In particular, US allies closer to China's borders are less likely to cooperate with China through BSAs. States in a territorial dispute with China are also less likely to sign a BSA with China. Counterintuitively, our findings suggest that the growth of China's military power and of its ability to back its economic interests seem to constrain its choice of BSA partners in regions closer to China given existing US military alliances, and emerging conflict from China’s territorial pursuits in its immediate neighbourhood.
‘The Perils of Technocratic Power: Central Bank Discretion and the End of Bretton Woods Revisited.’ With Jack Seddon, Waseda University. Revise and Resubmit.
Abstract:
Recent crises have cast doubt on the legitimacy of technocratic power, yet its role in global economic governance remains poorly understood. Revisiting the collapse of Bretton Woods, we propose a dynamic theory of global monetary governance to explain how expanding central bank discretion can destabilize systems. While most studies attribute the postwar system’s failure to power-political struggles, institutional weaknesses, or shifting economic ideas, they overlook the policies designed to manage and stabilize it. Drawing on historical institutionalism, we show how coordination tensions between rule-bound and discretionary policymakers---and the mutually reinforcing adaptation risks they faced---produced responses that appeared stabilizing in the short term but ultimately eroded long-run stability. New archival evidence from the IMF, BIS, and OECD reveals how tools like the London Gold Pool and currency swap lines extended central bank power, concealed macroeconomic imbalances, and crowded out political momentum for structural reform. As technocratic authority grew misaligned with political support and functional economic adjustment, it became a liability. This challenges the dominant view that technocratic actors are inherently superior in managing global economic policy.
Work in Progress
‘No Way Out: Financial Fragmentation and the Limits of Statecraft in the Global South.’ With Yumi Park, Copenhagen Business School.
Abstract:
Are China's bilateral swap agreements an effective tool for the financial statecraft of China and its borrowers in the Global South? China's swap program is perceived in the global south, as an instrument for reducing US dependence, both by de-dollarizing and as an alternative to the IMF. It's effectiveness in allowing states---both China and its swap partners---to achieve these goals is less clear. We evaluate how China's swap program operates within the broader global financial safety net (GFSN), comprising bilateral, unilateral, multilateral, and regional financing options and its implications for swap recipients in the Global South. We find that states that have IMF loan agreements or Third-Party swap lines in place, or are in negotiations with the IMF are more likely than other countries to sign swap lines with China. Thus, China's financial statecraft to provide an alternative to the US-led system is limited. To evaluate the statecraft of its borrowers, we find that China's swap lines perform less effectively that multilateral options (IMF loans) in terms in improving borrowers' liquidity positions, monetary policy discretion, exchange rate stability, and reserve positions. Where China's swap program is most effective is in enhancing states' access to the broader GFSN, in particular, improving the speed of IMF negotiations and the stringency of IMF conditions, to access dollars more easily and cheaply. As such, borrowers' statecraft to avoid the US-dominant system is also negligible. Taken together, our findings suggest that states pursuit of financial statecraft of China and its Global South borrowers, to alter the US-led international monetary order, remains limited by Global South reliance on US-led institutions and dollar-dependence. Paradoxically, China's financial statecraft ultimately serves the US-led monetary order rather than providing a pathway out. Our study adds to expanding knowledge about the fragmentation of the GFSN and the limits of financial statecraft of rising powers.
‘Terms and Conditions Apply: The (In)Effectiveness of China’s Swap Program and Persistent Dollar Dominance.’
Abstract:
To what extent are renminbi swap lines provided by China effective in achieving the goals of its partners? Since 2009, the People’s Bank of China has created an expanding network of currency swaps with its partners around the world to facilitate the internationalization of the renminbi. Many of China’s emerging and developing economy partners turned to these instruments to manage financial distress and to bolster their reserves. This paper evaluates the effectiveness of these lines for signatories' financial health, an aspect of swap lines that has largely been overlooked in the existing literature. I argue that while China's swap lines play an important window-dressing role, and provide important collateral for securing additional external financial assistance, their effect is limited in meeting recipients' goals of diversifying their reserve portfolios and signalling improved financial health. The limited effectiveness of renminbi swaps is a rooted in both China's domestic financial and political systems, as well as US dollar dominance. Using qualitative evidence from interviews conducted with monetary and financial authorities in recipient states, I evaluate my argument with three case studies on Indonesia, Sri Lanka and Argentina. The analyses in this paper illustrate the limits of China’s monetary expansion in a dollar-centric world and its implications for the global South.
‘Public Perceptions and Norm Diffusion in Central Bank Climate Policy.’
Abstract:
Under what conditions can central banks do climate policy? The United States Federal Reserve has taken a decidedly climate avoidant stance towards managing climate-related financial risks. Studies suggest domestic socio-political constraints impedes any Fed climate policy. Recent protests, however, suggest some appetite in the US public for a more activist central bank approach to climate change. This study aims to evaluate the extent to which public support for Fed climate policy is shaped by interpretations of the Fed's mandate. I also seek to evaluate whether information about proactive central bank climate policy abroad can generate support for the Fed climate policy. Using a mixed-methods approach of qualitative discourse analysis of Fed officials' speeches, I illustrate the domestic legitimacy concerns constraining Fed climate policy. I then propose a survey experiment, cuing respondents to the Fed's concerns and competing interpretations of its mandate, with additional information of central bank policy abroad, to identify sources of public support for the Fed to adopt a proactive climate policy. I expect that concerns about political independence will reduce support for possible climate policy, while informational cues about expanding its mandate to manage financial stability will increase support for climate policy. Finally, I expect that information about foreign central bank climate policies will increase support for the Fed to take on a more proactive climate stance. My study thus adds more nuance to domestic support for climate action, and identifies a a channel for norm diffusion through information about climate policy overseas.