Peer Reviewed Publications
‘The Perils of Technocratic Power: Central Bank Discretion and the End of Bretton Woods Revisited.’ With Jack Seddon. Accepted at International Theory.
Abstract:
Recent crises have cast doubt on the legitimacy of technocratic power, yet its role in global economic governance remains poorly understood. Revisiting the collapse of Bretton Woods, we propose a dynamic theory of global monetary governance to explain how expanding central bank discretion can destabilize systems. While most studies attribute the postwar system’s failure to power-political struggles, institutional weaknesses, or shifting economic ideas, they overlook the policies designed to manage and stabilize it. Drawing on historical institutionalism, we show how coordination tensions between rule-bound and discretionary policymakers—and the mutually reinforcing adaptation risks they faced—produced responses that appeared stabilizing in the short term but ultimately eroded long-run stability. New archival evidence from the IMF, BIS, and OECD reveals how tools like the London Gold Pool and currency swap lines extended central bank power, concealed macroeconomic imbalances, and crowded out political momentum for structural reform. As technocratic authority grew misaligned with political support and functional economic adjustment, it became a liability. In building this theory, we highlight the sociological, agent-level sources of instability rooted in technocratic policy discretion and interpersonal ties among central bankers—challenging the dominant view that technocratic actors are inherently superior in managing global economic policy.
‘Thinking Locally, Acting Globally: The Domestic Legitimacy of the US Federal Reserve as a Global Governor.’ With Michael Allen. Accepted at Review of International Organizations.
Abstract:
The US Federal Reserve regularly acts as the international lender of last resort. What effect does the Fed's global activism have on the US public's trust in it as an independent agency? Using two pre-registered survey experiments, we evaluate the effect of informational cues about the Fed's international lending on respondents' level of policy support and trust in the Fed. We find that performance- and procedural-cues affect attitudes towards policy support and trust differently. Policy support is influenced by performance cues concerning its effectiveness and geopolitical implications. Institutional trust is unaffected by performance cues but is influenced by cues expressing concern for the Fed's democratic accountability. Our findings contribute to debates on the popular support for central bank independence and the legitimacy of domestic institutions engaging in global governance.
‘Central Bankers in Crisis: Interpersonal Trust, Cooperation, and the Creation of the Fed Swap Network During the 2008 Global Financial Crisis.’ (2024). International Studies Quarterly. Volume 68, Issue 2, sqae030. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1093/isq/sqae030
2022 Best Graduate Paper Award, International Political Economy Section of the International Studies Association. (Under previous title: This Time It’s Interpersonal: Central Bankers’ Cooperation and the Creation of the Fed Swap Network During the Global Financial Crisis)
Abstract:
How do policymakers respond to global crises? I argue that interpersonal trust enables policymakers to engage in ad hoc cooperation, in conditions of crisis and uncertainty. Specifically, leaders' differential ties—of stronger, looser, or absent—interpersonal trust influenced economies' access to Federal Reserve swap lines over costlier unilateral and multilateral alternatives during the 2008 Global Financial Crisis. Using this framework, I reexamine the emergence of the Fed swap network. I triangulate evidence from elite interviews with former central bankers in office during the crisis, and transcripts of Fed meetings. My findings highlight the role of interpersonal trust as an operating variable in shaping patterns of international cooperation, and problematize the politics of technocratic governance. While successful, in enacting these crisis management policies, central bankers reinforce hierarchies and secrecy in global governance. This article thus draws attention to the contentious and undemocratic underpinnings of the global financial safety net.
‘Drawing the Line: The Politics of Federal Currency Swaps in the Global Financial Crisis.’ (2019). Review of International Political Economy. Volume 26, Issue 3. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1080/09692290.2019.1572639
Abstract:
Injecting over two trillion dollars into the international economy, the Federal Reserve effectively operated as an international lender of last resort during the 2008 financial crisis. Over half a trillion dollars went to foreign central banks through bilateral arrangements known as Central Bank Liquidity Swaps. While studies show that a key determinant of a country’s chances of receiving Fed liquidity was the exposure of US banks to the foreign economy, the literature overlooks the ambiguous and politicized nature of the Fed’s decision-making that explains the selection of emerging market swap recipients. Through a consideration of all economies that officially requested a swap line, including those rejected, this article analyses the bilateral politics of Fed swaps. By evaluating transcripts of the Fed’s deliberations, it identifies strategic motivations underlying the Fed’s decision-making and argues the Fed was more likely to grant a swap to economies that shared its policy preferences for greater capital account openness. Further, the article argues that the influence of shared policy preferences was mediated by political and diplomatic considerations. The article concludes that the Fed strategically chose its emerging economy partners to reinforce economic alliances, particularly with those who experienced increased influence in economic governance post-2008.
Working Papers and Chapters
‘Central Bankers’ in The Routledge Handbook of the History of Central Banking. (Eds) Clemens Jobst and Stefano Ugolini. Routledge (Under Contract).
‘The Limits of Economic Statecraft: China's Bilateral Swap Agreements and the External Security Environment.’ With Siyao Li and Scott Wingo.
Abstract:
The People's Bank of China (PBoC) has signed forty-one bilateral swap arrangements (BSAs) with a diverse set of partner economies since 2009. Despite China's increasing economic clout, monetary cooperation in China's regional orbit has been limited. Why is the reach of China's monetary ambitions limited in its own neighbourhood? We argue that the scope of China's swap network is constrained by security and geopolitical considerations by China and its partners. Our argument hinges on two dimensions of interest: whether a state is a US ally and its geographic proximity to China. We build our argument using qualitative evidence from elite interviews with current and former financial leaders from China's swap counterparties, and test our argument quantitatively using a cross-national panel of China's BSAs. We find that the likelihood of signing BSAs is influenced by states' security relations with both the US and China. In particular, US allies closer to China's borders are less likely to cooperate with China through BSAs. States in a territorial dispute with China are also less likely to sign a BSA with China. Counterintuitively, our findings suggest that the growth of China's military power and of its ability to back its economic interests seem to constrain its choice of BSA partners in regions closer to China given existing US military alliances, and emerging conflict from China’s territorial pursuits in its immediate neighbourhood.
‘The Limits of Dollar Challengers: China's Bilateral Swap Lines and Enduring Dollar Dominance in the Global South.’
Abstract:
Is the renminbi a viable dollar alternative for the Global South? Since 2009, the People’s Bank of China has created an expanding network of currency swaps with its partners around the world to facilitate the internationalization of the RMB. These lines present an attractive dollar alternative for many emerging and developing economies. Despite these developments, I argue that while China's swap lines play an important window-dressing role, renminbi swaps do not effectively facilitate currency diversification. The limited effectiveness of RMB swaps is a rooted in both China's domestic financial and political systems, and enduring US-dollar confidence, liquidity and transaction networks. Paradoxically, China's swap lines are more effective in facilitating dollar, and not renminbi, access. Using qualitative evidence from elite interviews I evaluate my argument with three case studies on Indonesia, Sri Lanka and Argentina. The analyses in this paper illustrate the limits of China’s monetary expansion and related mechanisms that perpetuate dollar dominance in the global South.
‘No Way Out: Financial Fragmentation and the Limits of Statecraft in the Global South.’ With Yumi Park.
Abstract:
How do China's expanding economic programs influence its partners? While China's growing bilateral swap program is often painted as an alternative to the US-led governance system, it does not enhance the financial statecraft of borrowers in navigating the fragmented global financial safety net. Rather than providing a credible exit option from International Monetary Fund (IMF) loans, signing a swap with China increases states' likelihood of signing Fund programs. US opposition to China's growing clout also permeates the fragmented governance landscape: China's swap partners are penalized in the US-led IMF, receiving more loans. China's swaps do not affect states’ financial health; participants in both China swaps and IMF loans experience deteriorated financial health. Paradoxically, China's economic initiatives serve the US-led monetary order rather than providing dissatisfied states a pathway out. Our study adds to expanding knowledge about the fragmentation of financial governance and the limits of the financial statecraft of borrowers.
Work in Progress
‘Central Banks and Growth.’ With Sanghyun Cho and Soeun Kim.
Abstract:
Central banks shape and respond to the macroeconomic environment in which governments pursue growth policies. But their distinct incentives and constraints to those of elected policymakers open up the possibility of misalignment between growth and monetary policy. We construct a framework based on principal-agent problems between growth coalitions, governments and central banks to explain the sources of institutional misalignment and their implication on growth trajectories. We illustrate our framework with two sets of comparative case studies: Norway and Venezuela, and Hungary and Vietnam. Our paper brings existing debates on central banking into the growth models literature and broadens the perspective to incorporate the interaction of policymakers in pursuing growth.