Peer Reviewed Publications
‘Thinking Locally, Acting Globally: The Domestic Legitimacy of the US Federal Reserve as a Global Governor.’ 2025. Review of International Organizations. With Michael O. Allen.
Abstract:
The US Federal Reserve regularly acts as the international lender of last resort. What effect does the Fed's global activism have on the US public's trust in it as an independent agency? Using two pre-registered survey experiments, we evaluate the effect of informational cues about the Fed's international lending on respondents' level of policy support and trust in the Fed. We find that performance- and procedural-cues affect attitudes towards policy support and trust differently. Policy support is influenced by performance cues concerning its effectiveness and geopolitical implications. Institutional trust is unaffected by performance cues but is influenced by cues expressing concern for the Fed's democratic accountability. Our findings contribute to debates on the popular support for central bank independence and the legitimacy of domestic institutions engaging in global governance.
‘The Perils of Technocratic Power: Central Bank Discretion and the End of Bretton Woods Revisited.’ 2025. International Theory, 17(3): 395–423. With Jack Seddon.
Abstract:
Recent crises have cast doubt on the legitimacy of technocratic power, yet its role in global economic governance remains poorly understood. Revisiting the collapse of Bretton Woods, we propose a dynamic theory of global monetary governance to explain how expanding central bank discretion can destabilize systems. While most studies attribute the postwar system’s failure to power-political struggles, institutional weaknesses, or shifting economic ideas, they overlook the policies designed to manage and stabilize it. Drawing on historical institutionalism, we show how coordination tensions between rule-bound and discretionary policymakers—and the mutually reinforcing adaptation risks they faced—produced responses that appeared stabilizing in the short term but ultimately eroded long-run stability. New archival evidence from the IMF, BIS, and OECD reveals how tools like the London Gold Pool and currency swap lines extended central bank power, concealed macroeconomic imbalances, and crowded out political momentum for structural reform. As technocratic authority grew misaligned with political support and functional economic adjustment, it became a liability. In building this theory, we highlight the sociological, agent-level sources of instability rooted in technocratic policy discretion and interpersonal ties among central bankers—challenging the dominant view that technocratic actors are inherently superior in managing global economic policy.
‘Central Bankers in Crisis: Interpersonal Trust, Cooperation, and the Creation of the Fed Swap Network During the 2008 Global Financial Crisis.’ 2024. International Studies Quarterly, 68(2): sqae030.
2022 Best Graduate Paper Award, International Political Economy Section of the International Studies Association. (Under previous title: This Time It’s Interpersonal: Central Bankers’ Cooperation and the Creation of the Fed Swap Network During the Global Financial Crisis)
Abstract:
How do policymakers respond to global crises? I argue that interpersonal trust enables policymakers to engage in ad hoc cooperation, in conditions of crisis and uncertainty. Specifically, leaders' differential ties—of stronger, looser, or absent—interpersonal trust influenced economies' access to Federal Reserve swap lines over costlier unilateral and multilateral alternatives during the 2008 Global Financial Crisis. Using this framework, I reexamine the emergence of the Fed swap network. I triangulate evidence from elite interviews with former central bankers in office during the crisis, and transcripts of Fed meetings. My findings highlight the role of interpersonal trust as an operating variable in shaping patterns of international cooperation, and problematize the politics of technocratic governance. While successful, in enacting these crisis management policies, central bankers reinforce hierarchies and secrecy in global governance. This article thus draws attention to the contentious and undemocratic underpinnings of the global financial safety net.
‘Drawing the Line: The Politics of Federal Currency Swaps in the Global Financial Crisis.’ 2019. Review of International Political Economy, 26(3): 461-489.
Abstract:
Injecting over two trillion dollars into the international economy, the Federal Reserve effectively operated as an international lender of last resort during the 2008 financial crisis. Over half a trillion dollars went to foreign central banks through bilateral arrangements known as Central Bank Liquidity Swaps. While studies show that a key determinant of a country’s chances of receiving Fed liquidity was the exposure of US banks to the foreign economy, the literature overlooks the ambiguous and politicized nature of the Fed’s decision-making that explains the selection of emerging market swap recipients. Through a consideration of all economies that officially requested a swap line, including those rejected, this article analyses the bilateral politics of Fed swaps. By evaluating transcripts of the Fed’s deliberations, it identifies strategic motivations underlying the Fed’s decision-making and argues the Fed was more likely to grant a swap to economies that shared its policy preferences for greater capital account openness. Further, the article argues that the influence of shared policy preferences was mediated by political and diplomatic considerations. The article concludes that the Fed strategically chose its emerging economy partners to reinforce economic alliances, particularly with those who experienced increased influence in economic governance post-2008.
Working Papers and Chapters
‘Central Bankers.’ In The Routledge Handbook of the History of Central Banking. (Eds) Clemens Jobst and Stefano Ugolini. Routledge (Under Contract).
‘The Limits of Economic Statecraft: China's Bilateral Swap Agreements and the External Security Environment.’ With Siyao Li. Accepted at Review of International Organzations.
Abstract:
The People's Bank of China (PBoC) has signed forty-one bilateral swap arrangements (BSAs) with a diverse set of partner economies since 2009. Despite China's increasing economic clout, monetary cooperation in China's regional orbit has been limited. Why is the reach of China's monetary ambitions limited in its own neighbourhood? We argue that the scope of China's swap network is constrained by security and geopolitical considerations by China and its partners. Our argument hinges on two dimensions of interest: whether a state is a US ally and its geographic proximity to China. We build our argument using qualitative evidence from elite interviews with current and former financial leaders from China's swap counterparties, and test our argument quantitatively using a cross-national panel of China's BSAs. We find that the likelihood of signing BSAs is influenced by states' security relations with both the US and China. In particular, US allies closer to China's borders are less likely to cooperate with China through BSAs. States in a territorial dispute with China are also less likely to sign a BSA with China. Counterintuitively, our findings suggest that the growth of China's military power and of its ability to back its economic interests seem to constrain its choice of BSA partners in regions closer to China given existing US military alliances, and emerging conflict from China’s territorial pursuits in its immediate neighbourhood.
‘How China Swaps: The Operation of RMB Currency Swaps in Emerging and Developing Markets and their Impact on Currency Internationalization.’ Revise and Resubmit.
Abstract:
Since 2009, the People’s Bank of China has created an expanding network of currency swaps around the world to facilitate renminbi internationalization (RMBI). These lines present an attractive dollar alternative for many emerging and developing economies. (EMDEs) Despite these developments, I argue that while China's swap lines may play an important window-dressing role and may enable dollar access, the terms and operation of the RMB swap lines themselves constrain broader currency use by EMDEs. China’s currency swaps reflect and transmit, previously studied economic, political, and geopolitical impediments to RMBI. They provide RMB liquidity that is contingent and restricted, thereby undermining usability and consequently, their capacity to support sustained international RMB use in global financial markets. Drawing on qualitative evidence from elite interviews I evaluate my argument with three case studies on Indonesia, Argentina and Sri Lanka. My analyses illustrate the limits of China’s monetary expansion in the global South.
‘Contested Growth Models: Central Banks, Governments and the Politics of Economic Growth’ With Sanghyun Cho and Soeun Kim. Under Review.
Abstract:
Under what conditions do central banks become central political actors in shaping economic growth? We argue that central banks can have a distinct impact on the growth model when the monetary authority enjoys substantial autonomy and is responding to a potential growth coalition that is different from that of the government. We use a principal-agent framework to evaluate patterns of potential institutional misalignment between governments and central banks. We illustrate the argument based on our case studies of Southern Europe and Hungary. The case studies show that not only a powerful supranational central bank as the ECB but also a domestic central bank in Hungary left a durable impact on the country's subsequent growth model. Our paper integrates debates on central banking into the growth model literature and extends the latter to peripheral economies by problematizing political contention within growth models.
‘When Help Hurts: Financial Fragmentation and the Limits of Statecraft in the Global South.’ With Yumi Park.
Abstract:
How do China's global economic initiatives influence its partners? We argue that while China's growing bilateral swaps are often painted as an alternative to the US-led governance system, it does not enhance the bargaining power of borrowers with traditional creditors. Rather, participation in China’s swap program is associated with a higher likelihood of signing International Monetary Fund (IMF) programs, particularly more stringent and less attractive IMF loans. Participants in both China swaps and IMF programs experience deteriorated financial health. We build our argument using elite interviews and test our hypotheses using a cross-national panel dataset of all swaps signed from 2006-2020, using a Bartik-style shift-share instrument and a two-stage Heckman selection model, as well as different-in-differences estimations. We show that China's economic initiatives serve the US-led monetary order rather than providing dissatisfied states a pathway to reduce their dependence on the IMF. Our study adds new insights on the implications of financial governance fragmentation and highlights the limits of the financial statecraft of borrowers.
‘Bilateral Backstops and Bond Markets: The Politics of Central Bank Swap Lines and Sovereign Credit Risk.’ With Lauren Ferry.
Bilateral swap agreements (BSAs) are a core pillar of the Global Financial Safety Net (GFSN), intended to provide emergency liquidity and reassure financial markets. As such, emerging markets increasingly sign BSAs with China, hoping, in part, to signal their ability to meet external obligations under stress. But under what conditions do China’s BSA affect market perceptions? We argue that while these instruments are often portrayed as de facto bailout mechanisms, their effectiveness ultimately depends on whether financial markets perceive them as credible backstops. Swap lines can reassure markets by providing liquidity without increasing debt burdens, but their opacity – particularly for Chinese BSAs – reduces their informational content. While time is typically expected to remedy uncertainty, investor learning about Chinese BSAs has further revealed usability constraints and political conditions, which diminishes their value over time. While in some cases credibility can be substituted by a country’s relevance in the broader geopolitical context, the average effect of Chinese BSAs on perceptions of creditworthiness should be minimal. We test these claims using a multi-method design that combines nineteen elite interviews – with both policymakers and private investors, quantitative analyses of country-month data on bond spreads for EMDEs from 2006–2020, and qualitative vignettes. To strengthen identification, we leverage an additional event study design around the announcement of swap agreements. Across these approaches, our findings show that Chinese BSAs do not uniformly improve market perceptions of credit risk; instead, their effects hinge on credibility and geopolitical alignment. Our findings point to a broader dynamic in which investors rely on the identity of the financing provider as a heuristic for assessing risk in an increasingly fragmented GFSN.
Work in Progress
‘What We Talk About When We Talk About the Economy: Towards a Typology of Economic Insecurity.’ With Nina Obermeier.
Abstract:
What do we mean when we talk about economic insecurity? This is an important concept that has been linked to key political outcomes such as voting behavior and attitudes towards policy issues. Economic in/security is measured in a variety of ways across different contexts, including objective measures of economic prosperity, individual-level financial security, and perceptions of current and future economic prospects. However, it is not always clear that these different measures are capturing the same underlying factors. In this paper, we make a first attempt to unpack the relationship between each of these different measures, as well as the relationship between the measures and partisanship. Using original survey data from the US, we build a typology of categories of economic insecurity and map these to commonly used measures. Our findings suggest that different measures of economic insecurity do in fact capture distinct aspects of economic sentiment and wellbeing. In addition, we find that some measures are strongly predicted by partisanship, while others are not. Our findings have important implications for the study of economic insecurity and perceptions in an era of increasing polarization.